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,QWHVWDWH6XFFHVVLRQ3DUW7ZRRIWKH6FRWWLVK/DZ&RPPLVVLRQ¶V'Lscussion 
Paper on Succession 
Kenneth McK. Norrie, University of Strathclyde 
 
Introduction 
It has long been traditional to characterise the law of succession as part of Property 
Law: the teaching of succession within Property classes at Scottish universities, 
which is more or less ubiquitous, creates a mindset from which it is difficult to 
escape.  This is understandable for, after all, succession law provides the rules for 
the transmission of property ownership and it invariably requires deeds and 
conveyances to be drawn up and sometimes involves conditions, burdens and 
different forms of title.  But at least in relation to intestate succession, it would be 
equally, or more, apt to characterise succession as a part of family law.  For the rules 
that have always applied in Scotland are designed to identify the closest family 
relationships, and to strike an appropriate balance between family members with 
differing relationships to the deceased.  Succession rights have always, literally, 
legitimated family relationships.  The 6FRWWLVK/DZ&RPPLVVLRQ¶VUHFHQW'LVFXVVLRQ
Paper on Succession (SLC DP 136, August 2007) is timely not because of any 
fundamental changes to the law of property, but because of shifting understandings 
in WKH FRQFHSW RI ³IDPLO\´  Social changes such as increased levels of divorce, 
second marriages and step relationships, and legal changes such as the introduction 
of civil partnership and the recognition of the legitimacy of claims of cohabitants, 
have all rendered the carefully constructed complexities of the Succession 
(Scotland) Act 1964 more and more out of touch with how family life in Scotland 
operates today.  The response of the SLC to the increased diversity and complexity 
of modern family life is to seek a simpler set of rules, for only thus, they believe, can 
anomalies and inconsistencies be avoided.  They do not seek to challenge the 
principle of family-based intestate succession  -  it is indeed difficult to envisage any 
practical alternative  -  but instead to recalibrate the balance of interests between 
different potential claimants.  They limit their consideration (in Part Two) to the 
situation of a deceased who is survived by a spouse/civil partner.  The clear winner 
in their proposed recalibration in that situation is the spouse/civil partner; as we will 
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see it will usually be the issue of the deceased who are the losers.  (It may be noted 
in passing that this will be the second time in recent years that issue lose out in law 
reform, for the share that cohabitants might now claim under s 29 of the Family Law 
(Scotland) Act 2006 will come from the portion that would otherwise have gone to 
issue). 
 
Outline of the Proposals 
Currently, when a person dies intestate survived by a spouse/civil partner, that 
spouse/civil partner has a variety of different entitlements: prior rights, which take 
precedence over all other claims and, subject to a financial limit, often exhaust the 
whole estate; legal rights, which are shared with any issue of the deceased; and 
rights under s 2 of the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, though these last are 
SRVWSRQHG WR SUHIHUUHG FODLPDQWV LQFOXGLQJ WKH GHFHDVHG¶V LVVXH VLEOLQJV RU WKHLU
representatives, i.e. nephews and nieces) and parents.  In their Discussion Paper, 
the SLC propose a much simpler approach, based on two all-embracing 
propositions.  First, where a person dies leaving a spouse/civil partner but no issue, 
that surviving spouse/civil partner should simply take the whole estate, whatever its 
nature and whatever its value (DP 136, para 2.26).  Secondly, where a person dies 
leaving a spouse/civil partner and issue, the surviving spouse/civil partner should be 
entitled to a fixed sum, tentatively set at ǧ300,000, with the remainder being shared 
with the issue.  This would mean that the whole estate goes to the spouse/civil 
partner where its value is OHVVWKDQWKHVWDWHGVXPLIWKHHVWDWH¶VYDOXHZHUHPRUH
than the fixed sum the excess would be divided equally with half going to the 
spouse/civil partner and the other half being shared amongst the issue (DP 136, 
para 2.57).  This approach is likely in most cases to give rather more than currently 
to the spouse/civil partner though the Discussion Paper (DP 136, para 2.50) provides 
some examples to show that the shift away from issue will often be modest.   
 
Possible Exceptions 
Following the traditional Scottish approach to intestate succession, which eschews 
discretion and variation due to the actual circumstances of the family relationship 
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involved, the SLC are not keen on any qualifications to the rules they propose, 
arguing that individual family circumstances are likely to be so diverse that subsidiary 
rules might not produce any more satisfactory results.  This is sensible.  The fewer 
subsidiary rules there are, the less scope there is for the disgruntled to seek a 
judicial examination of the nature of his or her parents¶ personal relationships.  
Having absolute rules fixed by the legal recognition of relationships has insulated 
Scotland from the bitterly fought family disputes for sometimes very modest 
successions that are common in countries that allow courts to sit in judgment on the 
nature of individual family relationships.  This strongly inclines the SLC to propose 
that the rules stated above should not be affected by the fact that the spouses/civil 
partners had separated (either in fact or judicially): the actual state of the relationship 
should be completely subsumed to its very existence (DP 136, para 2.64). 
The SLC are only slightly less convinced on the question of whether a child accepted 
by the deceased as a member of his or her family (typically a step-child) should be 
treated in WKH VDPH ZD\ DV D EORRG FKLOG LQ WKH GHFHDVHG¶V LQWHVWDWH VXFFHVVLRQ  
The simplifying instinct of the Commission, which inclines them to a negative answer 
(DP 136, para 2.80), is sound.  The concept of the ³DFFHSWHG FKLOG´, though well-
known in, for example, the law of aliment, is ill-tuned to the absolutist traditions of 
intestate succession where certainty and predictability are far more important than in 
needs-based alimentary claims.  ³$FFHSWDQFH´ LV QRW GHWHUPLQHG E\ VRPHWKLQJ DV
simple as a DNA test but by a minute examination of how the family organised itself 
and the interrelationship between its members.  Perhaps an even more serious 
objection to giving step-children and accepted children rights on intestacy is that that 
class of children would then be entitled to two (or perhaps even more) inheritances: 
the more a family is reconstituted, the more disparate will be the claims of children 
depending upon their life-experiences.  This would be bad social policy. 
 
A More Difficult Scenario 
A major imperative of the SLC is to ensure general public acceptance of how the 
rules on intestate succession operate.  This is important not because of a need for 
the law to reflect what people want, but because expectations are the basis of what 
can reasonably be assumed to be intended by a person who dies without a will.  I 
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have little doubt that the proposals so far discussed meet that imperative.  But I am 
far less sure that the result of always preferencing the spouse/civil partner without 
exception or qualification will be generally welcomed in some fairly common 
situations. 
Imagine that a man, let us call him Abraham, marries Sarah while they are young, 
and they have a child, Isaac.  They live together for 30 or 40 years (acquiring wealth, 
perhaps including family property inherited by Sarah from her parents).  OQ6DUDK¶V
death most people would probably agree with the SLC that Abraham should succeed 
to most or all of her estate.  ,VDDF LV OLNHO\ WR EH FRQWHQW WR ZDLW IRU KLV PRWKHU¶V
inheritance while his father yet lives.  But suppose further that after some years of 
lonely widowhood, Abraham meets and then marries Hagar, when they are both in 
their declining years2Q$EUDKDP¶VGHDWKLWLV+DJDUDQGQRW,VDDFZKRwould then 
WDNHPRVWRI$EUDKDP¶VHVWDWH (including that portion he succeeded to on the death 
of Sarah).  It is possible that Isaac might be persuaded to accept the justice of this 
result as the cost to be borne IRU WKH \HDUV RI KLV IDWKHU¶V WZLOLJKW KDSSLQHVV, and 
perhaps for the care and companionship Hagar relieved him from providing.  But the 
real problem comes when Hagar dies, because at that point all her property, 
including that which originally was acquired by Sarah and Abraham, would, on the 
existing law which is not affected by the 6/&¶V SURSRVDOV, pass to her (by now 
middle-aged) son called, of course, Ishmael. Isaac gets nothing from his paUHQWV¶
estates because, through marriage, it has all passed to Ishmael who had no blood 
connection to either Sarah or Abraham.  7KHKHLUORRPVIURP6DUDK¶VIDPLO\PRYHRXW
of her family.  It is not self-evident that this is a just outcome, nor one acceptable to 
Scottish society generally, nor one that is justified by any principle identified by the 
SLC  -  except the sterile tyranny  of simplicity. 
In reality this is not really a competition between surviving spouse/civil partner and 
issue but between a first family (represented by issue) and a second family 
(represented by the surviving spouse) and it may well be that the balance of interests 
is that situation needs to be struck differently from the balance in intra-familial 
competitions which will, presumably, be the norm.  The SLC address this issue at 
paras 2.65 ±  DQG H[SUHVV WKHLU ³LQFOLQDWLRQDW SUHVHQW´ WR PDNH QR GLVWLQFWLRQ
between different types of surviving spouse/civil partner ± issue competitions.  They 
VD\³WKHUDQJHRISRVVLEOHVLWXDWLRQV is too great and it is not clear that any new rule 
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ZRXOGSURGXFHPRUHVDWLVIDFWRU\ UHVXOWV WKDQ >WKHRQHEHLQJSURSRVHG@´ 7KH6/&
also points out that applying a different rule to non-parental spouses would have the 
practical effect of making a sharp distinction between spouses and civil partners, 
since the latter will seldom be shared (legal) parents. 
Taking the latter objection first, I am not sure that it is as strong as it sounds.  
Changes in the law (both adoption and human fertilisation) will in the coming years 
make it much more common for same-sex couples to be joint parents, and step-
relationships amongst opposite-sex couples already mean that substantial numbers 
of married couples are not joint parents of the children they are bringing up.  The 
other objection is more substantial.  In the example postulated above there is a clear 
separation between the first family and the second family, but this will not always be 
so and the variety of circumstances involving reconstituted families is almost 
infinitely great.  Hagar might have been the woman who brought Isaac up; Ishmael 
might have been the son of Abraham and Hagar and half-brother of Isaac; Hagar 
might have other children, now grown, who never lived in family with Abraham; 
Abraham might have other non-PDULWDO LVVXH$EUDKDP¶V ILUVWPDUULDJHPLJKWKDYH
lasted one year, while his second lasted ten, or forty.  Where, in other words, is the 
line to be drawn between the claims of a first and those of a second (or subsequent) 
family, and indeed the line between these families themselves?  The SLC have been 
unable to identify a clear principle upon which a departure from their simple spouse-
takes-virtually-everything rule might be based.  And nor can I. 
 
Conclusion 
The lesson here is perhaps that whatever the rules of intestacy are, they can deal 
satisfactorily only with the norm, and that protection from an unjust result in other 
cases can and must be sought through the simple expediency of making a will.  For 
it is to be remembered that intestacy rules are default rules, applicable only when 
there has been a failure by the deceased to express his or her wishes in valid form.  
It is to be hoped that when the new law, whatever its eventual shape, comes into 
force the Scottish Government and the legal profession make serious efforts to 
advise, encourage and persuade far more people to make a will than do so currently.  
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Might the marriage/civil partnership celebrant not also have a role in persuading any 
parent who marries of the need to at least consider whether or not to make a will? 
